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I. Introduction 
 
Engineers have been subject to explicit government regulation of their activities because they design and 
guide construction of physical structures used by other people and located in places where their decay or 
collapse could pose dangers to non-users as well.  As long as the effects of laboratory accidents remained 
confined within the lab itself, there was less concern about scientists’ daily activities.  This changed in the 
20th century as concerns about disposal of toxic substances, concerns about the possibility of germs 
spreading out from laboratories, or fears that genetically modified plants allowed in open fields would 
contaminate other areas increased.  Today both engineers and scientists find their activities governed by a 
range of regulations meant to protect the public from various hazards.  Scientists and engineers working in 
transnational collaborations, or in countries other than their own, need to be aware of the ways in which 
regulatory responses can differ.  Some of these differences stem from variations in the perceived 
acceptability of an activity in different cultures.  Others stem from different approaches to the common 
problem of identifying and regulating hazardous activity.  Yet, others stem from differences in reaction to 
scientific or technological breakthroughs. 
 
II. Differences in Social Mores inspiring Regulatory Standards 
 
Different societies may define the same activity in starkly contrasting ways, one regarding it as acceptable, 
another as dubious, and yet another as morally abhorrent.  In 1997, an unidentified technician at the 
French satellite TV broadcaster France Telecom got his company into considerable trouble by inadvertently 
shifting a sexually explicit movie intended for audiences in French Pacific Island territories onto a channel 
sending the signals to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf where the broadcast caused outrage.1  Homosexual 
relationships are another area of strong contrast, treated as acceptable in some societies, as dubious in 
others, and as so morally abhorrent that they are a crime punishable by death in others.2 
                                                     
1 A Saturday night surprise for the Saudis” The Economist 26 July 1997 p. 39  
 
2According to an activist organization, the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, at least 80 countries define 
same-sex sexual relations as crimes.  See “IGLHRC Commentary: End the criminal treatment of GLBT people” at 
http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/pressroom/iglhrcscommentaries/929.html (accessed 1 July 2009). 
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Most moral differences have little effect on the conduct of science or engineering, but some can have major 
implications if a particular moral precept is regarded as directly relevant to organizing scientists and 
engineering activity.  Many Christians and social conservatives in the USA object to scientific research 
using human stem cells derived from embryos because the stem cells cannot be secured without 
destroying the embryo.  A strict interpretation of their belief that human life begins at the moment when 
sperm penetrates egg logically entails the conclusion that intentionally destroying embryos is equivalent to 
murder.  The George W. Bush administration, which had considerable political support from conservatives 
sought to finesse the conflict developing between that bloc and Republican moderates who supported stem 
cell research by restricting federal research funding to work on embryonic stem cell lines already developed 
before 9 August 2001.  The rule meant that unless they could get funding elsewhere, US researchers had 
far more limited choices of material than their colleagues in other countries.  The limits were even more 
restrictive than Bush thought because of the “more than 60” stem cell lines he thought were ready for use, 
only 22 had been fully developed and leading scientists regarded many of those 22 as having limited 
usefulness.3 
 
III. Variations in Regulating Hazardous Activity 
 
Different societies may agree that the same activity is hazardous to other humans or to the environment, 
but regulate it in divergent ways.  Regulations can range from prohibiting the activity entirely, allowing it 
only in particular circumstances, requiring those who engage in the activity to take special measures to 
reduce hazards, or discouraging the activity through provisions of liability law. 
 
Completely banning an activity is most likely when its hazards are perceived as severe and its benefits as 
marginal.  Pressed by vocal citizen groups and environmentalist movements, the governments of major 
industrial countries have banned a significant number of human-created chemicals because their toxic 
effects are seen as greatly outweighing any benefit of using them.  However, bans on using particular 
chemicals apply only within the territory of the country or countries adopting the ban.  As long as use of the 
chemical is legal elsewhere, chemical makers could manufacture the banned chemical for export.  
Chemical companies supplying foreign markets usually succeed in staving off efforts to ban manufacture as 
well as use by arguing that banning manufacture will favor foreign companies not subject to a ban on 
manufacturing, thereby reducing local income and/or jobs. 
 
That a chemical banned in some countries is not banned in all may reflect political or physical conditions.  
Many governments lack the scientific and administrative resources to test chemicals for toxic effects, but 
can compensate for that by observing regulatory trends elsewhere and banning any chemical after one or 
more industrial states with extensive testing capacity has adopted a ban.  The problem of keeping track of 
bans has been simplified as developing country governments unhappy about what they perceived as the 
dumping of now-banned chemicals on their countries’ markets sought to use their majorities in UN Bodies 
to secure international agreements that would allow them control of cross-border sales of toxic chemicals.  
The first result was the UNEP International Register for Potentially Toxic Chemicals, which included 
information about chemical hazards and listings of chemicals that had been banned or subjected to use 
restrictions.  This was later linked to voluntary (1987-) and Mandatory (1991-) systems of securing prior 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
3 Chris Mooney, The Republican War on Science (2005), pp. 2-4 and 185-204. 
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government permission for imports of chemicals on the Register.  The Register became more useful over 
time, first as an FAO/UNEP Joint Group of Experts was established to provide technical guidance for 
compiling of lists of banned or restricted chemicals and coordinated the process of developing the Decision 
Guidance Documents that indicate the types and severity of hazards posed by chemicals included on the 
list of those requiring import permits.4 
 
Differences based on varying perceptions of particular chemicals’ usefulness remain.  The ability to kill a 
wide range of pests that made the chemical dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) attractive in the 1940s 
became perceived as a serious problem in the early 1960s, and it was banned in most industrial countries 
by 1980.  Developing states were slower to ban DDT, not merely because environmental movement 
influence was lower but also because of the chemical’s perceived usefulness against malaria-carrying 
mosquitoes and in agriculture.5 
 
Sometimes debates about the hazards of an activity lead to regulations limiting the activity rather than a 
complete ban.  This may occur because the activity or product remains the best available choice for 
particular uses.  Bans on adding tetraethyl lead to enhance combustion of gasoline (petrol) used in land 
transport were adopted in North America in the 1970s, most parts of Europe in the 1990s, and in China in 
2001 because substitutes were available, however a newer “low lead” formulation remains the primacy 
additive in 100 octane aviation fuel because a cost-effective substitute has not been found.  Other ban 
proposals fail because of objections on other grounds.  Until the hazards of exposure to tobacco smoke 
from other people’s cigarettes and cigars were firmly demonstrated, efforts to ban smoking foundered on 
objections that they would interfere too much with individuals’ lifestyle choices.  Even with better 
understanding of hazards, bans cover only enclosed public spaces.   
 
Societies can react to perceptions of hazard by subjecting an activity to special regulations and/or requiring 
that those engaged in it have particular training.  Training standards may be reinforced by a system of 
government licensing for individuals seeking to carry on an activity.  Engineering is a licensed profession in 
most countries of the world; not only must aspiring engineers be trained in schools of engineering 
accredited by national engineering societies; they must pass government-administered tests and meet 
other experience requirements.  An engineer whose work or inattention is identified as contributing to a 
major structural or process failure is likely to lose the license.  Scientists are not directly licensed, but the 
scientific community insists that newcomers have training in accredited academic programs; laboratories 
are also covered by any general or specific requirements regarding abatement of hazards to persons and 
the environment in force where the lab is located.  Social sensitivities about lab hazards have grown since 
the mid 20th century, and scientists are now more aware of need to take public views into account.  
Awareness of public unease and concern that governments might regulate the work out of existence 
induced the world’s leading genetic scientists to observe a moratorium on genetic modification research 
                                                     
4 See David Victor, “’Learning by doing’ in the nonbinding international regime to manage trade in hazardous chemicals and 
pesticides,” in David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, eds.  The Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Commitments, 221-281. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998. 
 
5C.F. Curtis, “Should DDT continue to be recommended for malaria vector control?" Medical and Veterinary Entomology, Vol. 8 
(2):107-112 (1994). 
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while they examined the hazards of such work and developed global standards for reducing those hazards 
as much as possible in 1974-1975.6 
 
Liability law can be used to discourage particular activity in several ways.  Imposing a standard of “strict” 
(sometimes called “absolute”) liability requiring those who engage in a particular activity responsible to 
repairing or provide monetary compensation for any and all damage it causes to others or their property.  
Imposing this standard automatically increases the cost of insurance because it exposes the doer to more 
claims than the more usual conditional liability standard that requires repair of or monetary compensation of 
harm only when a) the activity violates another person’s rights, b) the harm is inflicted intentionally, or c) the 
harm arises from negligence in conduct of the activity.7   
 
IV. Variations in Reaction to Scientific or Technological Breakthroughs 
 
Differences in social presumptions regarding new activities can also produce different reactions to the 
same scientific or technological breakthrough.  A significant portion of the US-EU argument about sale of 
plants bred with genetic modification techniques and foods containing ingredients from such plants stems 
form differences in the assumptions used to guide policy formulation in each area.  In the EU, plants 
created through genetic modification are regarded as significantly different than those developed by 
grafting, hybridization, and other previously-developed techniques for selective breeding; they may not be 
grown in fields or used as human or animal food unless such use has been specifically approved.  Thus, 
the EU’s basic policy guideline is “prohibited unless specifically permitted.”  In the USA, plants created 
through genetic modification techniques are regarded as “essentially similar” to those developed by older 
methods of selective breeding and may be grown and used in food unless proven to be hazardous.  Thus, 
the USA’s basic policy guideline is “permitted unless specifically prohibited.”  If national food markets were 
completely distinct, with EU countries meeting all their food needs from within the EU, and the USA 
meeting all its food needs from within the USA, the difference in regulatory standards would pose no 
particular problems.  US farmers would follow US standards, European farmers would follow EU standards, 
and each would only sell at home.  However, national food markets are linked.  The difference in regulatory 
assumptions means that many US products are unacceptable in the EU while all EU products are 
acceptable in the USA.  European farmers can export more to the USA than US farmers can export to EU 
countries, and this difference in trade opportunities has been the source of serious contention between the 
EU and the USA. 
 
Significant differences in major countries’ regulations require persons or firms in third countries who want to 
export goods covered by the divergent regulations to decide which set of regulations to meet.  Farmers or 
food processors in third countries who want to export to Western industrial countries might decide to cater 
to one market and not the other, opting to follow either EU or USA standards.  If they want to export to both 
markets, the logically simplest choice is to meet the more restrictive standards since anything meeting 
more restrictive standards will automatically meet less restrictive ones.  Following this logic, they would 
grow only those genetically modified plants approved for sale in the EU.  Whether third country suppliers 
follow this logic depends on two factors: a) the extra cost (if any) involved in meeting the stricter regulations 
                                                     
6Paul Berg and Maxine F. Singer. “The recombinant DNA controversy: Twenty years later,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science 92: 9011-9013 (Sept. 1995) 
 
7 Basic concepts are summarized in Edward J. Kionka, Torts in a Nutshell (Minneapolis, MN: Thompson/West, 2005). 
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and b) whether opportunities to export to the country or countries with the most restrictive regulation are 
great enough to make altering production to meet the more restrictive standards worthwhile. 
 
Decisions about which importing country regulations to satisfy pervade major industries.  For years 
environmentalists argued that division of the world into more than 200 states each making their own 
regulations would always trigger a “race to the bottom” in which companies would locate their production in 
the countries with the least regulation on ingredients put into products and of pollution created while making 
them, and those regulations would set the global tone because governments of other countries would fear 
losing industries to the weak regulation countries.  More recently, analysts of government regulation have 
noted that it is possible to set up a “race to the top” regarding ingredients and product performance if the 
governments having the strictest regulations rule countries whose domestic markets account for a large 
share of world sales.8  Large domestic markets mean that product performance standards set by the USA 
and the EU have been particularly influential; standards set in Japan, China, India, and Brazil are also 
becoming more important as people in those countries become wealthier and can buy a wider range of 
products. 
 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. What are the sources of differences in standards? 
 
2. What are the different ways societies can deal with activity regarded as hazardous?  Can you give an 
example of each of the different responses? 
 
3. Companies, organizations, and individuals operating in more than one country can deal with 
differences in standards by choosing to carry out activity where regulations are least demanding, 
adapting activity to the rules in each location where it occurs, or following the demanding regulations 
everywhere.  Can you give an example of a company’s or organization’s choice when faced with 
different regulations? 
 
 
<end> 
 
 
                                                     
8 Within the USA, where state governments have authority to set product performance standards in many areas, this pressure for 
satisfying tight regulations is known as “the California effect.”  Consumers in that state form about 20% of the US domestic 
market, and California has adopted particularly strict regulations in a number of areas.  See David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer 
and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
 
